This paper presents an Isabelle/HOL+Isar [1, 4] set of theories which allows to specify crypto-based components and to verify their composition properties wrt. cryptographic aspects. We introduce a formalisation of the security property of data secrecy, the corresponding definitions and proofs. A part of these definitions is based on [3] . Please note that here we import here the Isabelle/HOL theory ListExtras.thy, presented in [2] .
Auxiliary data types
theory Secrecy-types imports Main begin -We assume disjoint sets: Data of data values, -Secrets of unguessable values, Keys -set of cryptographic keys.
-Based on these sets, we specify the sets EncType of encryptors that may be -used for encryption or decryption, and Expression of expression items.
-The specification (component) identifiers should be listed in the set specID, -the channel indentifiers should be listed in the set chanID.
datatype Keys = CKey | CKeyP | SKey | SKeyP | genKey datatype Secrets = secretD | N | NA type-synonym Var = nat type-synonym Data = nat datatype KS = kKS Keys | sKS Secrets datatype EncType = kEnc Keys | vEnc Var datatype specID = sComp1 | sComp2 | sComp3 | sComp4 datatype Expression = kE Keys | sE Secrets | dE Data | idE specID datatype chanID = ch1 | ch2 | ch3 | ch4 -Predicate insuring the correct relations between -to the set of input, output and local channels of a component definition correctInOutLoc :: specID ⇒ bool where correctInOutLoc x ≡ (ins x ) ∩ (out x ) = {} ∧ (ins x ) ∩ (loc x ) = {} ∧ (loc x ) ∩ (out x ) = {} -Predicate insuring the correct relations between -sets of input channels within a composed component definition correctCompositionIn :: specID ⇒ bool where correctCompositionIn x ≡ (ins x ) = ( (ins ' (subcomponents x )) − (loc x )) ∧ (ins x ) ∩ ( (out ' (subcomponents x ))) = {} -Predicate insuring the correct relations between -sets of output channels within a composed component definition correctCompositionOut :: specID ⇒ bool where correctCompositionOut x ≡ (out x ) = ( (out ' (subcomponents x ))− (loc x )) ∧ (out x ) ∩ ( (ins ' (subcomponents x ))) = {} -Predicate insuring the correct relations between -sets of local channels within a composed component definition correctCompositionLoc :: specID ⇒ bool where correctCompositionLoc x ≡ (loc x ) = (ins ' (subcomponents x )) ∩ (out ' (subcomponents x ))
-If a component is an elementary one (has no subcomponents) -its set of local channels should be empty lemma subcomponents-loc: assumes correctCompositionLoc x and subcomponents x = {} shows loc x = {} using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionLoc-def ) end 3 Secrecy: Definitions and properties theory Secrecy imports Secrecy-types inout ListExtras begin -Encryption, decryption, signature creation and signature verification functions -For these functions we define only their signatures and general axioms, -because in order to reason effectively, we view them as abstract functions and -abstract from their implementation details consts Enc :: Keys ⇒ Expression list ⇒ Expression list Decr :: Keys ⇒ Expression list ⇒ Expression list Sign :: Keys ⇒ Expression list ⇒ Expression list Ext :: Keys ⇒ Expression list ⇒ Expression list -Axioms on relations between encription and decription keys axiomatization EncrDecrKeys :: Keys ⇒ Keys ⇒ bool where ExtSign: EncrDecrKeys K1 K2 −→ (Ext K1 (Sign K2 E )) = E and DecrEnc: EncrDecrKeys K1 K2 −→ (Decr K2 (Enc K1 E )) = E -Set of private keys of a component consts specKeys :: specID ⇒ Keys set -Set of unguessable values used by a component consts specSecrets :: specID ⇒ Secrets set -Join set of private keys and unguessable values used by a component definition specKeysSecrets :: specID ⇒ KS set where
-Predicate defining that a list of expression items does not contain -any private key or unguessable value used by a component definition notSpecKeysSecretsExpr :: specID ⇒ Expression list ⇒ bool where
-If a component is a composite one, the set of its private keys -is a union of the subcomponents' sets of the private keys definition correctCompositionKeys :: specID ⇒ bool where correctCompositionKeys x ≡ subcomponents x = {} −→ specKeys x = (specKeys ' (subcomponents x ))
-If a component is a composite one, the set of its unguessable values -is a union of the subcomponents' sets of the unguessable values definition correctCompositionSecrets :: specID ⇒ bool where correctCompositionSecrets x ≡ subcomponents x = {} −→ specSecrets x = (specSecrets ' (subcomponents x ))
-If a component is a composite one, the set of its private keys and -unguessable values is a union of the corresponding sets of its subcomponents definition correctCompositionKS :: specID ⇒ bool where correctCompositionKS x ≡ subcomponents x = {} −→ specKeysSecrets x = (specKeysSecrets ' (subcomponents x )) -Predicate defining set of correctness properties of the component's -interface and relations on its private keys and unguessable values definition correctComponentSecrecy :: specID ⇒ bool where
-Predicate exprChannel I E defines whether the expression item E can be sent via the channel I consts exprChannel :: chanID ⇒ Expression ⇒ bool -Predicate eoutM sP M E defines whether the component sP may eventually -output an expression E if there exists a time interval t of -an output channel which contains this expression E definition eout :: specID ⇒ Expression ⇒ bool where eout sP E ≡ ∃ (ch :: chanID ). ((ch ∈ (out sP )) ∧ (exprChannel ch E )) -Predicate eout sP E defines whether the component sP may eventually -output an expression E via subset of channels M, -which is a subset of output channels of sP, -and if there exists a time interval t of -an output channel which contains this expression E definition eoutM :: specID ⇒ chanID set ⇒ Expression ⇒ bool where
-Predicate ineM sP M E defines whether a component sP may eventually -get an expression E if there exists a time interval t of -an input stream which contains this expression E definition ine :: specID ⇒ Expression ⇒ bool where ine sP E ≡ ∃ (ch :: chanID ). ((ch ∈ (ins sP )) ∧ (exprChannel ch E )) -Predicate ine sP E defines whether a component sP may eventually -get an expression E via subset of channels M, -which is a subset of input channels of sP, -and if there exists a time interval t of -an input stream which contains this expression E definition ineM :: specID ⇒ chanID set ⇒ Expression ⇒ bool where
-This predicate defines whether an input channel ch of a component sP -is the only one input channel of this component -via which it may eventually output an expression E definition out-exprChannelSingle ::
-This predicate yields true if only the channels from the set chSet, -which is a subset of input channels of the component sP, -may eventually output an expression E definition out-exprChannelSet :: specID ⇒ chanID set ⇒ Expression ⇒ bool where
-This redicate defines whether -an input channel ch of a component sP is the only one input channel -of this component via which it may eventually get an expression E definition ine-exprChannelSingle ::
-This predicate yields true if the component sP may eventually -get an expression E only via the channels from the set chSet, -which is a subset of input channels of sP definition ine-exprChannelSet :: specID ⇒ chanID set ⇒ Expression ⇒ bool where
-If a list of expression items does not contain any private key -or unguessable value of a component P, then the first element -of the list is neither a private key nor unguessable value of P lemma notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-L1 :
using assms by (simp add : notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-def )
-If a list of expression items does not contain any private key -or unguessable value of a component P, then this list without its first -element does not contain them too lemma notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-L2 : assumes notSpecKeysSecretsExpr P (a # l ) shows notSpecKeysSecretsExpr P l using assms by (simp add : notSpecKeysSecretsExpr-def )
-If a channel belongs to the set of input channels of a component P -and does not belong to the set of local channels of the compositon of P and Q -then it belongs to the set of input channels of this composition lemma correctCompositionIn-L1 : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and ch / ∈ loc PQ and ch ∈ ins P shows ch ∈ ins PQ using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionIn-def ) -If a channel belongs to the set of input channels of the compositon of P and Q -then it belongs to the set of input channels either of P or of Q lemma correctCompositionIn-L2 : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and ch ∈ ins PQ shows (ch ∈ ins P ) ∨ (ch ∈ ins Q ) using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionIn-def ) lemma ineM-L1 : assumes ch ∈ M and ch ∈ ins P and exprChannel ch E shows ineM P M E using assms by (simp add : ineM-def , blast ) lemma ineM-ine: assumes ineM P M E shows ine P E using assms by (simp add : ineM-def ine-def , blast ) lemma not-ine-ineM : assumes ¬ ine P E shows ¬ ineM P M E using assms by (simp add : ineM-def ine-def ) lemma eoutM-eout : assumes eoutM P M E shows eout P E using assms by (simp add : eoutM-def eout-def , blast ) lemma not-eout-eoutM : assumes ¬ eout P E shows ¬ eoutM P M E using assms by (simp add : eoutM-def eout-def ) lemma correctCompositionKeys-subcomp1 : assumes correctCompositionKeys C and x ∈ subcomponents C and xb ∈ specKeys C shows ∃ x ∈ subcomponents C . (xb ∈ specKeys x ) using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionKeys-def , auto) lemma correctCompositionSecrets-subcomp1 : assumes correctCompositionSecrets C and x ∈ subcomponents C and s ∈ specSecrets C shows ∃ x ∈ subcomponents C . (s ∈ specSecrets x ) using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionSecrets-def , auto) lemma correctCompositionKeys-subcomp2 : assumes correctCompositionKeys C and xb ∈ subcomponents C and xc ∈ specKeys xb shows xc ∈ specKeys C using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionKeys-def , auto) lemma correctCompositionSecrets-subcomp2 : assumes correctCompositionSecrets C and xb ∈ subcomponents C
and xc ∈ specSecrets xb shows xc ∈ specSecrets C using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionSecrets-def , auto) lemma correctCompKS-Keys: assumes correctCompositionKS C shows correctCompositionKeys C proof (cases subcomponents C = {}) assume subcomponents C = {} from this and assms show ?thesis by (simp add : correctCompositionKeys-def ) next assume subcomponents C = {} from this and assms show ?thesis by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def correctCompositionKeys-def specKeysSecrets-def , blast ) qed lemma correctCompKS-Secrets: assumes correctCompositionKS C shows correctCompositionSecrets C proof (cases subcomponents C = {}) assume subcomponents C = {} from this and assms show ?thesis by (simp add : correctCompositionSecrets-def ) next assume subcomponents C = {} from this and assms show ?thesis by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def correctCompositionSecrets-def specKeysSecrets-def , blast ) qed lemma correctCompKS-KeysSecrets: assumes correctCompositionKeys C and correctCompositionSecrets C shows correctCompositionKS C proof (cases subcomponents C = {}) assume subcomponents C = {} from this and assms show ?thesis by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def ) next assume subcomponents C = {} from this and assms show ?thesis by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def correctCompositionKeys-def correctCompositionSecrets-def specKeysSecrets-def , blast ) qed lemma correctCompositionKS-subcomp1 : assumes correctCompositionKS C and h1 :x ∈ subcomponents C and xa ∈ specKeys C shows ∃ y ∈ subcomponents C . (xa ∈ specKeys y) proof (cases subcomponents C = {}) assume subcomponents C = {} from this and h1 show ?thesis by simp next assume subcomponents C = {} from this and assms show ?thesis by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def specKeysSecrets-def , blast ) qed lemma correctCompositionKS-subcomp2 : assumes correctCompositionKS C and h1 :x ∈ subcomponents C and xa ∈ specSecrets C shows ∃ y ∈ subcomponents C . xa ∈ specSecrets y proof (cases subcomponents C = {}) assume subcomponents C = {} from this and h1 show ?thesis by simp next assume subcomponents C = {} from this and assms show ?thesis by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def specKeysSecrets-def , blast ) qed lemma correctCompositionKS-subcomp3 : assumes correctCompositionKS C and x ∈ subcomponents C and xa ∈ specKeys x shows xa ∈ specKeys C using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def specKeysSecrets-def , auto) lemma correctCompositionKS-subcomp4 : assumes correctCompositionKS C and x ∈ subcomponents C and xa ∈ specSecrets x shows xa ∈ specSecrets C using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def specKeysSecrets-def , auto) lemma correctCompositionKS-PQ : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q } and correctCompositionKS PQ
and ks ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ shows ks ∈ specKeysSecrets P ∨ ks ∈ specKeysSecrets Q using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def ) lemma correctCompositionKS-neg1 : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q } and correctCompositionKS PQ and ks / ∈ specKeysSecrets P and ks / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q shows ks / ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def ) lemma correctCompositionKS-negP : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q } and correctCompositionKS PQ and ks / ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ shows ks / ∈ specKeysSecrets P using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def ) lemma correctCompositionKS-negQ : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q } and correctCompositionKS PQ and ks / ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ shows ks / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-def ) lemma out-exprChannelSingle-Set : assumes out-exprChannelSingle P ch E shows out-exprChannelSet P {ch} E using assms by (simp add : out-exprChannelSingle-def out-exprChannelSet-def ) lemma out-exprChannelSet-Single: assumes out-exprChannelSet P {ch} E shows out-exprChannelSingle P ch E using assms by (simp add : out-exprChannelSingle-def out-exprChannelSet-def ) lemma ine-exprChannelSingle-Set : assumes ine-exprChannelSingle P ch E shows ine-exprChannelSet P {ch} E using assms by (simp add : ine-exprChannelSingle-def ine-exprChannelSet-def ) lemma ine-exprChannelSet-Single: assumes ine-exprChannelSet P {ch} E shows ine-exprChannelSingle P ch E using assms by (simp add : ine-exprChannelSingle-def ine-exprChannelSet-def ) lemma ine-ins-neg1 : assumes ¬ ine P m and exprChannel x m shows x / ∈ ins P using assms by (simp add : ine-def , auto) theorem TBtheorem1a: assumes ine PQ E and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ shows ine P E ∨ ine Q E using assms by (simp add : ine-def correctCompositionIn-def , auto) theorem TBtheorem1b: assumes ineM PQ M E and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ shows ineM P M E ∨ ineM Q M E using assms by (simp add : ineM-def correctCompositionIn-def , auto) theorem TBtheorem2a: assumes eout PQ E and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionOut PQ shows eout P E ∨ eout Q E using assms by (simp add : eout-def correctCompositionOut-def , auto) theorem TBtheorem2b: assumes eoutM PQ M E and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionOut PQ shows eoutM P M E ∨ eoutM Q M E using assms by (simp add : eoutM-def correctCompositionOut-def , auto) lemma correctCompositionIn-prop1 : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and x ∈ (ins PQ ) shows (x ∈ (ins P )) ∨ (x ∈ (ins Q )) using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionIn-def ) lemma correctCompositionOut-prop1 : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionOut PQ and x ∈ (out PQ ) shows (x ∈ (out P )) ∨ (x ∈ (out Q )) using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionOut-def ) theorem TBtheorem3a: assumes ¬ (ine P E ) and ¬ (ine Q E ) and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ shows ¬ (ine PQ E ) using assms by (simp add : ine-def correctCompositionIn-def , auto ) theorem TBlemma3b:
and h2 :¬ (ineM Q M E ) and subPQ :subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and cCompI :correctCompositionIn PQ and chM :ch ∈ M and chPQ :ch ∈ ins PQ and eCh:exprChannel ch E shows False proof (cases ch ∈ ins P ) assume a1 :ch ∈ ins P from a1 and chM and eCh have ineM P M E by (simp add : ineM-L1 ) from this and h1 show ?thesis by simp next assume a2 :ch / ∈ ins P from subPQ and cCompI and chPQ have (ch ∈ ins P ) ∨ (ch ∈ ins Q ) by (simp add : correctCompositionIn-L2 ) from this and a2 have ch ∈ ins Q by simp from this and chM and eCh have ineM Q M E by (simp add : ineM-L1 ) from this and h2 show ?thesis by simp qed theorem TBtheorem3b:
and ¬ (ineM Q M E ) and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ shows ¬ (ineM PQ M E ) using assms by (metis TBtheorem1b) theorem TBtheorem4a-empty:
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and loc PQ = {} shows ine PQ E using assms by (simp add : ine-def correctCompositionIn-def , auto) theorem TBtheorem4a-P : assumes ine P E and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and ∃ ch. (ch ∈ (ins P ) ∧ exprChannel ch E ∧ ch / ∈ (loc PQ )) shows ine PQ E using assms by (simp add : ine-def correctCompositionIn-def , auto) theorem TBtheorem4b-P : assumes ineM P M E and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and ∃ ch.
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and ∃ ch.
theorem TBtheorem4a-notP1 : assumes ine P E and ¬ ine Q E and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and ∃ ch. ((ine-exprChannelSingle P ch E ) ∧ (ch ∈ (loc PQ ))) shows ¬ ine PQ E using assms by (simp add : ine-def correctCompositionIn-def ine-exprChannelSingle-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem4b-notP1 : assumes ineM P M E and ¬ ineM Q M E and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and ∃ ch.
theorem TBtheorem4a-notP2 : assumes ¬ ine Q E and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and ine-exprChannelSet P ChSet E and ∀ (x ::chanID ). ((x ∈ ChSet ) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ ))) shows ¬ ine PQ E using assms by (simp add : ine-def correctCompositionIn-def ine-exprChannelSet-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem4b-notP2 : assumes ¬ ineM Q M E and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and ine-exprChannelSet P ChSet E and ∀ (x ::chanID ).
theorem TBtheorem4a-notPQ : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and ine-exprChannelSet P ChSetP E and ine-exprChannelSet Q ChSetQ E and ∀ (x ::chanID ).
theorem TBtheorem4b-notPQ : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and ine-exprChannelSet P ChSetP E and ine-exprChannelSet Q ChSetQ E and ∀ (x ::chanID ).
and ChSet = {} shows ¬ ine P E using assms by (simp add : ine-def ine-exprChannelSet-def ) theorem TBtheorem5a-empty:
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionOut PQ and loc PQ = {} shows eout PQ E using assms by (simp add : eout-def correctCompositionOut-def , auto) theorem TBtheorem45a-P : assumes eout P E and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionOut PQ and ∃ ch. ((ch ∈ (out P )) ∧ (exprChannel ch E ) ∧ (ch / ∈ (loc PQ ))) shows eout PQ E using assms by (simp add : eout-def correctCompositionOut-def , auto) theorem TBtheore54b-P : assumes eoutM P M E and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionOut PQ and ∃ ch.
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionOut PQ and ∃ ch. (((ch ∈ (out P )) ∨ (ch ∈ (out Q ) )) ∧ (exprChannel ch E ) ∧ (ch / ∈ (loc PQ ))) shows eout PQ E using assms by (simp add : eout-def correctCompositionOut-def , auto) theorem TBtheorem5b-PQ :
and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionOut PQ and ∃ ch.
and ¬ eout Q E and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionOut PQ and ∃ ch. ((out-exprChannelSingle P ch E ) ∧ (ch ∈ (loc PQ ))) shows ¬ eout PQ E using assms by (simp add : eout-def correctCompositionOut-def out-exprChannelSingle-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem5b-notP1 : assumes eoutM P M E and ¬ eoutM Q M E and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionOut PQ and ∃ ch.
theorem TBtheorem5a-notP2 : assumes ¬ eout Q E and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionOut PQ and out-exprChannelSet P ChSet E and ∀ (x ::chanID ). ((x ∈ ChSet ) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ ))) shows ¬ eout PQ E using assms by (simp add : eout-def correctCompositionOut-def out-exprChannelSet-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem5b-notP2 : assumes ¬ eoutM Q M E and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionOut PQ and out-exprChannelSet P ChSet E and ∀ (x ::chanID ). ((x ∈ ChSet ) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ ))) shows ¬ eoutM PQ M E using assms by (simp add : eoutM-def correctCompositionOut-def out-exprChannelSet-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem5a-notPQ : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionOut PQ and out-exprChannelSet P ChSetP E and out-exprChannelSet Q ChSetQ E and ∀ (x ::chanID ). ((x ∈ ChSetP ) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ ))) and ∀ (x ::chanID ). ((x ∈ ChSetQ ) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ ))) shows ¬ eout PQ E using assms by (simp add : eout-def correctCompositionOut-def out-exprChannelSet-def , auto)
theorem TBtheorem5b-notPQ : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionOut PQ and out-exprChannelSet P ChSetP E and out-exprChannelSet Q ChSetQ E and M = ChSetP ∪ ChSetQ and ∀ (x ::chanID ). ((x ∈ ChSetP ) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ ))) and ∀ (x ::chanID ). ((x ∈ ChSetQ ) −→ (x ∈ (loc PQ ))) shows ¬ eoutM PQ M E using assms by (simp add : eoutM-def correctCompositionOut-def out-exprChannelSet-def , auto) end 4 Local Secrets of a component theory CompLocalSecrets imports Secrecy begin -Set of local secrets: the set of secrets which does not belong to -the set of private keys and unguessable values, but are transmitted -via local channels or belongs to the local secrets of its subcomponents axiomatization LocalSecrets :: specID ⇒ KS set where LocalSecretsDef :
lemma LocalSecretsComposition1 : assumes ls ∈ LocalSecrets P and subcomponents PQ = {P , Q } shows ls ∈ LocalSecrets PQ using assms by (simp (no-asm) only: LocalSecretsDef , auto) lemma LocalSecretsComposition-exprChannel-k : assumes exprChannel x (kE Keys) and ¬ ine P (kE Keys) and ¬ ine Q (kE Keys) and ¬ (x / ∈ ins P ∧ x / ∈ ins Q ) shows False using assms by (metis ine-def ) lemma LocalSecretsComposition-exprChannel-s: assumes exprChannel x (sE Secrets) and ¬ ine P (sE Secrets) and ¬ ine Q (sE Secrets) and ¬ (x / ∈ ins P ∧ x / ∈ ins Q ) shows False using assms by (metis ine-ins-neg1 ) lemma LocalSecretsComposition-neg1-k : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q } and correctCompositionLoc PQ and ¬ ine P (kE Keys) and ¬ ine Q (kE Keys) and kKS Keys / ∈ LocalSecrets P and kKS Keys / ∈ LocalSecrets Q shows kKS Keys / ∈ LocalSecrets PQ proof − from assms show ?thesis apply (simp (no-asm) only: LocalSecretsDef , simp add : correctCompositionLoc-def , clarify) by (rule LocalSecretsComposition-exprChannel-k , auto) qed lemma LocalSecretsComposition-neg-k : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionLoc PQ and correctCompositionKS PQ and (kKS m) / ∈ specKeysSecrets P and (kKS m) / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q and ¬ ine P (kE m) and ¬ ine Q (kE m) and (kKS m) / ∈ ((LocalSecrets P ) ∪ (LocalSecrets Q )) shows (kKS m) / ∈ (LocalSecrets PQ ) proof − from assms show ?thesis apply (simp (no-asm) only: LocalSecretsDef , simp add : correctCompositionLoc-def , clarify) by (rule LocalSecretsComposition-exprChannel-k , auto) qed lemma LocalSecretsComposition-neg-s: assumes subPQ :subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and cCompLoc:correctCompositionLoc PQ and cCompKS :correctCompositionKS PQ and notKSP :(sKS m) / ∈ specKeysSecrets P and notKSQ :(sKS m) / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q and ¬ ine P (sE m) and ¬ ine Q (sE m) and notLocSeqPQ :(sKS m) / ∈ ((LocalSecrets P ) ∪ (LocalSecrets Q )) shows (sKS m) / ∈ (LocalSecrets PQ ) proof − from subPQ and cCompKS and notKSP and notKSQ have sg1 :sKS m / ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-neg1 ) from subPQ and cCompLoc and notLocSeqPQ have sg2 : sKS m / ∈ (LocalSecrets ' subcomponents PQ ) by simp from sg1 and sg2 and assms show ?thesis apply (simp (no-asm) only: LocalSecretsDef , simp add : correctCompositionLoc-def , clarify) by (rule LocalSecretsComposition-exprChannel-s, auto) qed lemma LocalSecretsComposition-neg: assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionLoc PQ and correctCompositionKS PQ and ks / ∈ specKeysSecrets P and ks / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q and h1 :∀ m. ks = kKS m −→ (¬ ine P (kE m) ∧ ¬ ine Q (kE m)) and h2 :∀ m. ks = sKS m −→ (¬ ine P (sE m) ∧ ¬ ine Q (sE m)) and ks / ∈ ((LocalSecrets P ) ∪ (LocalSecrets Q )) shows ks / ∈ (LocalSecrets PQ ) proof (cases ks) fix m assume a1 :ks = kKS m from this and h1 have ¬ ine P (kE m) ∧ ¬ ine Q (kE m) by simp from this and a1 and assms show ?thesis by (simp add : LocalSecretsComposition-neg-k ) next fix m assume a2 :ks = sKS m from this and h2 have ¬ ine P (sE m) ∧ ¬ ine Q (sE m) by simp from this and a2 and assms show ?thesis by (simp add : LocalSecretsComposition-neg-s) qed lemma LocalSecretsComposition-neg1-s: assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q } and correctCompositionLoc PQ and ¬ ine P (sE s) and ¬ ine Q (sE s) and sKS s / ∈ LocalSecrets P and sKS s / ∈ LocalSecrets Q shows sKS s / ∈ LocalSecrets PQ proof − from assms have sKS s / ∈ (LocalSecrets ' subcomponents PQ ) by simp from assms and this show ?thesis apply (simp (no-asm) only: LocalSecretsDef , simp add : correctCompositionLoc-def , clarify) by (rule LocalSecretsComposition-exprChannel-s, auto) qed lemma LocalSecretsComposition-neg1 : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q } and correctCompositionLoc PQ and h1 :∀ m. ks = kKS m −→ (¬ ine P (kE m) ∧ ¬ ine Q (kE m)) and h2 :∀ m. ks = sKS m −→ (¬ ine P (sE m) ∧ ¬ ine Q (sE m)) and ks / ∈ LocalSecrets P and ks / ∈ LocalSecrets Q shows ks / ∈ LocalSecrets PQ proof (cases ks) fix m assume a1 :ks = kKS m from this and h1 have ¬ ine P (kE m) ∧ ¬ ine Q (kE m) by simp from this and a1 and assms show ?thesis by (simp add : LocalSecretsComposition-neg1-k ) next fix m assume a2 :ks = sKS m from this and h2 have ¬ ine P (sE m) ∧ ¬ ine Q (sE m) by simp from this and a2 and assms show ?thesis by (simp add : LocalSecretsComposition-neg1-s) qed lemma LocalSecretsComposition-ine1-k : assumes kKS k ∈ LocalSecrets PQ and subcomponents PQ = {P , Q } and correctCompositionLoc PQ and ¬ ine Q (kE k ) and kKS k / ∈ LocalSecrets P and kKS k / ∈ LocalSecrets Q shows ine P (kE k ) using assms by (metis LocalSecretsComposition-neg1-k ) lemma LocalSecretsComposition-ine1-s: assumes sKS s ∈ LocalSecrets PQ and subcomponents PQ = {P , Q } and correctCompositionLoc PQ and ¬ ine Q (sE s) and sKS s / ∈ LocalSecrets P and sKS s / ∈ LocalSecrets Q shows ine P (sE s) using assms by (metis LocalSecretsComposition-neg1-s) lemma LocalSecretsComposition-ine2-k : assumes kKS k ∈ LocalSecrets PQ and subcomponents PQ = {P , Q } and correctCompositionLoc PQ and ¬ ine P (kE k ) and kKS k / ∈ LocalSecrets P and kKS k / ∈ LocalSecrets Q shows ine Q (kE k ) using assms by (metis LocalSecretsComposition-ine1-k ) lemma LocalSecretsComposition-ine2-s: assumes sKS s ∈ LocalSecrets PQ and subcomponents PQ = {P , Q } and correctCompositionLoc PQ and ¬ ine P (sE s) and sKS s / ∈ LocalSecrets P and sKS s / ∈ LocalSecrets Q shows ine Q (sE s) using assms by (metis LocalSecretsComposition-ine1-s) lemma LocalSecretsComposition-neg-loc-k : assumes kKS key / ∈ LocalSecrets P and exprChannel ch (kE key) and kKS key / ∈ specKeysSecrets P shows ch / ∈ loc P using assms by (simp only: LocalSecretsDef , auto) lemma LocalSecretsComposition-neg-loc-s: assumes sKS secret / ∈ LocalSecrets P and exprChannel ch (sE secret ) and sKS secret / ∈ specKeysSecrets P shows ch / ∈ loc P using assms by (simp only: LocalSecretsDef , auto) lemma correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-k-P : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionKS PQ and kKS key / ∈ LocalSecrets PQ and ch ∈ ins P and exprChannel ch (kE key) and kKS key / ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ and correctCompositionIn PQ shows ch ∈ ins PQ ∧ exprChannel ch (kE key) using assms by (metis LocalSecretsComposition-neg-loc-k correctCompositionIn-L1 ) lemma correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-k-Pex : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionKS PQ and kKS key / ∈ LocalSecrets PQ and ch ∈ ins P and exprChannel ch (kE key) and kKS key / ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ and correctCompositionIn PQ shows ∃ ch. ch ∈ ins PQ ∧ exprChannel ch (kE key) using assms by (metis correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-k-P ) lemma correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-k-Q : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionKS PQ and kKS key / ∈ LocalSecrets PQ and ch ∈ ins Q and h1 :exprChannel ch (kE key) and kKS key / ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ and correctCompositionIn PQ shows ch ∈ ins PQ ∧ exprChannel ch (kE key) proof − from assms have ch / ∈ loc PQ by (simp add : LocalSecretsComposition-neg-loc-k ) from this and assms have ch ∈ ins PQ by (simp add : correctCompositionIn-def ) from this and h1 show ?thesis by simp qed lemma correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-k-Qex : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionKS PQ and kKS key / ∈ LocalSecrets PQ and ch ∈ ins Q and exprChannel ch (kE key) and kKS key / ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ and correctCompositionIn PQ shows ∃ ch. ch ∈ ins PQ ∧ exprChannel ch (kE key) using assms by (metis correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-k-Q ) lemma correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-s-P : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionKS PQ and sKS secret / ∈ LocalSecrets PQ and ch ∈ ins P and exprChannel ch (sE secret ) and sKS secret / ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ and correctCompositionIn PQ shows ch ∈ ins PQ ∧ exprChannel ch (sE secret ) using assms by (metis LocalSecretsComposition-neg-loc-s correctCompositionIn-L1 ) lemma correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-s-Pex : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionKS PQ and sKS secret / ∈ LocalSecrets PQ and ch ∈ ins P and exprChannel ch (sE secret ) and sKS secret / ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ and correctCompositionIn PQ shows ∃ ch. ch ∈ ins PQ ∧ exprChannel ch (sE secret ) using assms by (metis correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-s-P ) lemma correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-s-Q : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionKS PQ and sKS secret / ∈ LocalSecrets PQ and ch ∈ ins Q and h1 :exprChannel ch (sE secret ) and sKS secret / ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ and correctCompositionIn PQ shows ch ∈ ins PQ ∧ exprChannel ch (sE secret ) proof − from assms have ch / ∈ loc PQ by (simp add : LocalSecretsComposition-neg-loc-s) from this and assms have ch ∈ ins PQ by (simp add : correctCompositionIn-def ) from this and h1 show ?thesis by simp qed lemma correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-s-Qex : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionKS PQ and sKS secret / ∈ LocalSecrets PQ and ch ∈ ins Q and exprChannel ch (sE secret ) and sKS secret / ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ and correctCompositionIn PQ shows ∃ ch. ch ∈ ins PQ ∧ exprChannel ch (sE secret ) using assms by (metis correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-s-Q ) • m is a concatenation of some lists of secrets m 1 and m 2 , and A knows both these secrets,
• A knows some secret key k −1 and the result of the encryption of the m with the corresponding public key,
• A knows some public key k and the result of the signature creation of the m with the corresponding private key,
• m is an encryption of some secret m 1 with a public key k, and A knows both m 1 and k,
• m is the result of the signature creation of the m 1 with the key k, and A knows both m 1 and k.
knows C [KS2Expression (kKS m1 )] = know C (kKS m1 ) and know1s:
knows C [KS2Expression (sKS m2 )] = know C (sKS m2 ) and knows2a:
knows A (e1 @ e) −→ knows A e and knows2b:
knows A (e @ e1 ) −→ knows A e and knows3 :
(knows A e1 ) ∧ (knows A e2 ) −→ knows A (e1 @ e2 ) and knows4 :
(IncrDecrKeys k1 k2 ) ∧ (know A (kKS k2 )) ∧ (knows A (Enc k1 e)) −→ knows A e and knows5 :
(IncrDecrKeys k1 k2 ) ∧ (know A (kKS k1 )) ∧ (knows A (Sign k2 e)) −→ knows A e and knows6 :
and eout C (kE m) shows m ∈ (specKeys C ) ∨ (know C (kKS m)) using assms by (metis eout-know-k ) lemma eoutKnowCorrect-L1s: assumes eoutKnowCorrect C (sKS m) and eout C (sE m) shows m ∈ (specSecrets C ) ∨ (know C (sKS m)) using assms by (metis eout-know-s) lemma eoutKnowsECorrect-L1 : assumes eoutKnowsECorrect C e and eout C e
shows know A (kKS m) using assms by (metis KS2Expression.simps(1 ) know1k ) lemma know2knowsPQ-k : shows ¬ know A (sKS m) using assms by (metis know2knows-s)
and knows A e2 shows knows A e using assms by (metis knows2a knows2b) lemma correctCompositionInLoc-exprChannel : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and ch : ins P and exprChannel ch m and ∀ x . x ∈ ins PQ −→ ¬ exprChannel x m shows ch : loc PQ using assms by (simp add : correctCompositionIn-def , auto) lemma eout-know-nonKS-k : assumes m / ∈ specKeys A and eout A (kE m) and eoutKnowCorrect A (kKS m) shows know A (kKS m) using assms by (metis eoutKnowCorrect-L1k ) lemma eout-know-nonKS-s: assumes m / ∈ specSecrets A and eout A (sE m) and eoutKnowCorrect A (sKS m) shows know A (sKS m) using assms by (metis eoutKnowCorrect-L1s)
lemma not-know-k-not-ine: assumes ¬ know A (kKS m) shows ¬ ine A (kE m) using assms by simp lemma not-know-s-not-ine: assumes ¬ know A (sKS m) shows ¬ ine A (sE m) using assms by simp lemma not-know-k-not-eout : assumes m / ∈ specKeys A and ¬ know A (kKS m) and eoutKnowCorrect A (kKS m) shows ¬ eout A (kE m) using assms by (metis eout-know-k ) lemma not-know-s-not-eout : assumes m / ∈ specSecrets A and ¬ know A (sKS m) and eoutKnowCorrect A (sKS m) shows ¬ eout A (sE m) using assms by (metis eout-know-nonKS-s) lemma adv-not-know1 : assumes out P ⊆ ins A and ¬ know A (kKS m) shows ¬ eout P (kE m) using assms by (metis (full-types) eout-def ine-ins-neg1 not-know-k-not-ine set-rev-mp) lemma adv-not-know2 : assumes out P ⊆ ins A and ¬ know A (sKS m) shows ¬ eout P (sE m) using assms by (metis (full-types) eout-def ine-ins-neg1 not-know-s-not-ine set-rev-mp) lemma LocalSecrets-L1 : assumes (kKS ) key ∈ LocalSecrets P and (kKS key) / ∈ (LocalSecrets ' subcomponents P ) shows kKS key / ∈ specKeysSecrets P using assms by (simp only: LocalSecretsDef , auto) lemma LocalSecrets-L2 : assumes kKS key ∈ LocalSecrets P and kKS key ∈ specKeysSecrets P shows kKS key ∈ (LocalSecrets ' subcomponents P ) using assms by (simp only: LocalSecretsDef , auto) lemma know-composition1 : assumes notKSP :m / ∈ specKeysSecrets P and notKSQ :m / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q and know P m and subPQ :subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and cCompI :correctCompositionIn PQ and cCompKS :correctCompositionKS PQ shows know PQ m proof (cases m) fix key assume a1 :m = kKS key show ?thesis proof (cases ine P (kE key)) assume a11 :ine P (kE key) from this have a11ext :ine P (kE key) | ine Q (kE key) by simp from subPQ and cCompKS and notKSP and notKSQ have m / ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ by (rule correctCompositionKS-neg1 ) from this and a1 have sg1 :kKS key / ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ by simp from a1 and a11ext and cCompKS show ?thesis proof (cases loc PQ = {}) assume a11locE :loc PQ = {} from a11ext and subPQ and cCompI and a11locE have ine PQ (kE key) by (rule TBtheorem4a-empty) from this and a1 show ?thesis by auto next assume a11locNE :loc PQ = {} from a1 and a11 and sg1 and assms show ?thesis apply (simp add : ine-def , auto) by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-k-Pex ) qed next assume a12 :¬ ine P (kE key) from this and a1 and assms show ?thesis by (auto, simp add : LocalSecretsComposition1 ) qed next fix secret assume a2 :m = sKS secret show ?thesis proof (cases ine P (sE secret )) assume a21 :ine P (sE secret ) from this have a21ext :ine P (sE secret ) | ine Q (sE secret ) by simp from subPQ and cCompKS and notKSP and notKSQ have m / ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ by (rule correctCompositionKS-neg1 ) from this and a2 have sg2 :sKS secret / ∈ specKeysSecrets PQ by simp from a2 and a21ext and cCompKS show ?thesis proof (cases loc PQ = {}) assume a21locE :loc PQ = {} from a21ext and subPQ and cCompI and a21locE have ine PQ (sE secret )
by (rule TBtheorem4a-empty) from this and a2 show ?thesis by auto next assume a21locNE :loc PQ = {} from a2 and a21 and sg2 and assms show ?thesis apply (simp add : ine-def , auto) by (simp add : correctCompositionKS-exprChannel-s-Pex ) qed next assume a12 :¬ ine P (sE secret ) from this and a2 and assms show ?thesis by (metis LocalSecretsComposition1 know .simps(2 )) qed qed lemma know-composition2 : assumes m / ∈ specKeysSecrets P and m / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q and know Q m and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and correctCompositionKS PQ shows know PQ m using assms by (metis insert-commute know-composition1 ) lemma know-composition: assumes m / ∈ specKeysSecrets P and m / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q and know P m ∨ know Q m and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and correctCompositionKS PQ shows know PQ m using assms by (metis know-composition1 know-composition2 ) theorem know-composition-neg-ine-k : assumes ¬ know P (kKS key) and ¬ know Q (kKS key) and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ shows ¬ (ine PQ (kE key)) using assms by (metis TBtheorem3a not-know-k-not-ine) theorem know-composition-neg-ine-s: assumes ¬ know P (sKS secret ) and ¬ know Q (sKS secret ) and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ shows ¬ (ine PQ (sE secret )) using assms by (metis TBtheorem3a not-know-s-not-ine) lemma know-composition-neg1 : assumes notknowP :¬ know P m and notknowQ :¬ know Q m and subPQ :subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and cCompLoc:correctCompositionLoc PQ and cCompI :correctCompositionIn PQ shows ¬ know PQ m proof (cases m) fix key assume a1 :m = kKS key from notknowP and a1 have sg1 :¬ know P (kKS key) by simp then have sg1a:¬ ine P (kE key) by simp from sg1 have sg1b:kKS key / ∈ LocalSecrets P by simp from notknowQ and a1 have sg2 :¬ know Q (kKS key) by simp then have sg2a:¬ ine Q (kE key) by simp from sg2 have sg2b:kKS key / ∈ LocalSecrets Q by simp from sg1 and sg2 and subPQ and cCompI have sg3 :¬ ine PQ (kE key)
by (rule know-composition-neg-ine-k ) from subPQ and cCompLoc and sg1a and sg2a and sg1b and sg2b have sg4 : kKS key / ∈ LocalSecrets PQ by (rule LocalSecretsComposition-neg1-k ) from sg3 and sg4 and a1 show ?thesis by simp next fix secret assume a2 :m = sKS secret from notknowP and a2 have sg1 :¬ know P (sKS secret ) by simp then have sg1a:¬ ine P (sE secret ) by simp from sg1 have sg1b:sKS secret / ∈ LocalSecrets P by simp from notknowQ and a2 have sg2 :¬ know Q (sKS secret ) by simp then have sg2a:¬ ine Q (sE secret ) by simp from sg2 have sg2b:sKS secret / ∈ LocalSecrets Q by simp from sg1 and sg2 and subPQ and cCompI have sg3 :¬ ine PQ (sE secret )
by (rule know-composition-neg-ine-s) from subPQ and cCompLoc and sg1a and sg2a and sg1b and sg2b have sg4 : sKS secret / ∈ LocalSecrets PQ by (rule LocalSecretsComposition-neg1-s) from sg3 and sg4 and a2 show ?thesis by simp qed lemma know-decomposition: assumes knowPQ :know PQ m and subPQ :subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and cCompI :correctCompositionIn PQ and cCompLoc:correctCompositionLoc PQ shows know P m ∨ know Q m proof (cases m) fix key assume a1 :m = kKS key from this show ?thesis proof (cases ine PQ (kE key)) assume a11 :ine PQ (kE key) from this and subPQ and cCompI and a1 have ine P (kE key) ∨ ine Q (kE key) by (simp add : TBtheorem1a) from this and a1 show ?thesis by auto next assume a12 :¬ ine PQ (kE key) from this and knowPQ and a1 have sg2 :kKS key ∈ LocalSecrets PQ by auto show ?thesis proof (cases know Q m) assume know Q m from this show ?thesis by simp next assume not-knowQm:¬ know Q m from not-knowQm and a1 have sg3a:¬ ine Q (kE key) by simp from not-knowQm and a1 have sg3b:kKS key / ∈ LocalSecrets Q by simp show ?thesis proof (cases kKS key ∈ LocalSecrets P ) assume kKS key ∈ LocalSecrets P from this and a1 show ?thesis by simp next assume kKS key /shows knows A [kE m] using assms by (metis Expression.distinct (1 ) Expression.inject (1 ) eoutKnowsECorrect-L1 ) lemma eout-knows-nonKS-s: assumes h1 :m / ∈ specSecrets A and h2 :eout A (sE m) and h3 :eoutKnowsECorrect A (sE m) shows knows A [sE m] using assms by (metis Expression.distinct (1 ) Expression.inject (2 ) eoutKnowsECorrect-def ) lemma not-knows-k-not-ine:
shows ¬ ine A (kE m) using assms by (metis knows2know-neg-k not-know-k-not-ine)
lemma not-knows-s-not-ine:
shows ¬ ine A (sE m) using assms by (metis knows2know-neg-s not-know-s-not-ine)
lemma not-knows-k-not-eout : assumes m / ∈ specKeys A and ¬ knows A [kE m] and eoutKnowsECorrect A (kE m) shows ¬ eout A (kE m) using assms by (metis eout-knows-nonKS-k ) lemma not-knows-s-not-eout : assumes m / ∈ specSecrets A and ¬ knows A [sE m] and eoutKnowsECorrect A (sE m) shows ¬ eout A (sE m) using assms by (metis eout-knows-nonKS-s) lemma adv-not-knows1 : assumes out P ⊆ ins A and ¬ knows A [kE m] shows ¬ eout P (kE m) using assms by (metis adv-not-know1 knows2know-neg-k ) lemma adv-not-knows2 : assumes out P ⊆ ins A and ¬ knows A [sE m] shows ¬ eout P (sE m) using assms by (metis adv-not-know2 knows2know-neg-s) lemma knows-decomposition-1-k : assumes kKS a / ∈ specKeysSecrets P and kKS a / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q and subcomponents PQ = {P , Q } and knows PQ [kE a] and correctCompositionIn PQ and correctCompositionLoc PQ shows knows P [kE a] ∨ knows Q [kE a] using assms by (metis know-decomposition knows1k ) lemma knows-decomposition-1-s: assumes sKS a / ∈ specKeysSecrets P and sKS a / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q and subcomponents PQ = {P , Q } and knows PQ [sE a] and correctCompositionIn PQ and correctCompositionLoc PQ shows knows P [sE a] ∨ knows Q [sE a] using assms by (metis know-decomposition knows1s) lemma knows-decomposition-1 : assumes subcomponents PQ = {P , Q } and knows PQ [a] and correctCompositionIn PQ and correctCompositionLoc PQ and (∃ z . a = kE z ) ∨ (∃ z . a = sE z ) and ∀ z . a = kE z −→ kKS z / ∈ specKeysSecrets P ∧ kKS z / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q and h7 :∀ z . a = sE z −→ sKS z / ∈ specKeysSecrets P ∧ sKS z / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q shows knows P [a] ∨ knows Q [a] using assms by (metis knows-decomposition-1-k knows-decomposition-1-s) lemma knows-composition1-k : assumes (kKS m) / ∈ specKeysSecrets P and (kKS m) / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q and knows P [kE m] and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and correctCompositionKS PQ shows knows PQ [kE m] using assms by (metis know-composition knows1k ) lemma knows-composition1-s: assumes (sKS m) / ∈ specKeysSecrets P and (sKS m) / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q and knows P [sE m] and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and correctCompositionKS PQ shows knows PQ [sE m] using assms by (metis know-composition knows1s) lemma knows-composition2-k : assumes (kKS m) / ∈ specKeysSecrets P and (kKS m) / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q and knows Q [kE m] and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and correctCompositionKS PQ shows knows PQ [kE m] using assms by (metis know2knowsPQ-k know-composition knows2know-k ) lemma knows-composition2-s: assumes (sKS m) / ∈ specKeysSecrets P and (sKS m) / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q and knows Q [sE m] and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionIn PQ and correctCompositionKS PQ shows knows PQ [sE m] using assms by (metis know2knowsPQ-s know-composition knows2know-s) lemma knows-composition-neg1-k : assumes kKS m / ∈ specKeysSecrets P and kKS m / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q and ¬ knows P [kE m] and ¬ knows Q [kE m] and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionLoc PQ and correctCompositionIn PQ and correctCompositionKS PQ shows ¬ knows PQ [kE m] using assms by (metis know-decomposition knows1k ) lemma knows-composition-neg1-s: assumes sKS m / ∈ specKeysSecrets P and sKS m / ∈ specKeysSecrets Q and ¬ knows P [sE m] and ¬ knows Q [sE m] and subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and correctCompositionLoc PQ and correctCompositionIn PQ and correctCompositionKS PQ shows ¬ knows PQ [sE m] using assms by (metis knows-decomposition-1-s) lemma knows-concat-1 : assumes knows P (a # e) shows knows P [a] using assms by (metis append-Cons append-Nil knows2 ) lemma knows-concat-2 : assumes knows P (a # e) shows knows P e using assms by (metis append-Cons append-Nil knows2a) lemma knows-concat-3 : assumes knows P [a]
and knows P e shows knows P (a # e) using assms by (metis append-Cons append-Nil knows3 )
lemma not-knows-conc-knows-elem-not-knows-tail : assumes ¬ knows P (a # e) and knows P [a] shows ¬ knows P e using assms by (metis knows-concat-3 )
lemma not-knows-conc-not-knows-elem-tail : assumes ¬ knows P (a#e) shows ¬ knows P [a] ∨ ¬ knows P e using assms by (metis append-Cons append-Nil knows3 ) lemma not-knows-elem-not-knows-conc: assumes ¬ knows P [a] shows ¬ knows P (a # e) using assms by (metis knows-concat-1 ) lemma not-knows-tail-not-knows-conc: assumes ¬ knows P e shows ¬ knows P (a # e) using assms by (metis knows-concat-2 ) lemma knows-composition3 : fixes e::Expression list assumes knows P e and subPQ :subcomponents PQ = {P ,Q } and cCompI :correctCompositionIn PQ and cCompKS :correctCompositionKS PQ and ∀ (m::Expression). ((m mem e) −→ ((∃ z1 . m = (kE z1 )) ∨ (∃ z2 . m = (sE z2 )))) and notSpecKeysSecretsExpr P e and notSpecKeysSecretsExpr Q e shows knows PQ e and notSpecKeysSecretsExpr Q e shows knows PQ e using assms by (metis knows-composition3 knows-composition4 ) end
